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Abstract
Silicon avalanche photodiodes are the most sensitive photodetectors in the visible
to near infrared region. However, when they are used for single photon detection in a
Geiger mode, they are known to emit light on the controlled breakdown used to detect a
photoelectron. This fluorescence light might have serious impacts on experimental ap-
plications like quantum cryptography or single-particle spectroscopy. We characterized
the fluorescence behaviour of silicon avalanche photodiodes in the experimentally sim-
ple passive quenching configuration and discuss implications for their use in quantum
cryptography systems.
1 Introduction
For a long time, silicon avalanche photodiodes (APD) have been used for single photon
detection in the near-infrared region[1, 2] because of their high quantum efficiency and low
dark count rate. These properties are particularly important for quantum cryptography[3,
4, 5, 6], where a huge yield of secure bits and a low signal/noise ratio is crucial.
To obtain a single photon counting behaviour, the avalanche diode is operated in an all-
or-nothing counting mode similar to the way Geiger detectors are used in nuclear physics
for particle counting. In this so-called Geiger mode, the diode is reversely biased above
the breakdown voltage such that a single photoelectron can generate a self-sustaining dis-
charge. The discharge current is used as an indicator for the generation of a photoelectron
and thus of an absorbed photon. Thereby, a timing accuracy better then 60 ps has been
achieved[7].
It has been observed previously that the avalanche of charge carriers is accompanied
by photon emission[8]. Although this light emission is not very strong, in several single
photon counting applications it may have serious impacts on the experiment. In quan-
tum cryptography, for example, such a light emission might enable an external observer
to gain information of a photo detection event on the receiver side, opening a possible
eavesdropping back door to an otherwise secure communication channel. Another exper-
imental situation in which this photoemission has to be considered are photon correlation
measurements, as they are performed in single atom or molecule spectroscopy. In a typi-
cal Hanburry-Brown–Twiss configuration, two photodetectors are looking onto a faint light
source, and one has to ensure that light emitted in the breakdown flash of one photodiode
is not causing artificial photo events in the second photodetector due to residual crosstalk
between the two photodetectors[9, 10, 11]. It is therefore important to know the photoe-
mission characteristics of that breakdown photoemission to avoid crosstalk with the light
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Figure 1: Operation of the APD in passive quenching mode. The diode (with a junction
capacity Cj and a parasitic capacity Cp) is reverse biased via a high impedance quenching
network Rq above the breakdown voltage. At diode breakdown, the parasitic capacity Cp
discharges through the load resistance Rm, causing a voltage peak indicating the break-
down.
to be detected. In this paper, we describe our investigation of the temporal and spectral
distribution as well as the absolute amount of light emitted during a detection event.
2 Photodiode operation
A photodetection process is initiated by a photoelectron created after absorption of a photon
in a reverse-biased pn-junction. This electron is accelerated into a highly doped region
where an avalanche of charge carriers is triggered. In single photon counting mode, the bias
voltage exceeds the breakdown voltage of the diode, meaning that once an avalanche has
been triggered, it is self-sustaining as long as the external voltage exceeds the breakdown
threshold. To avoid the thermal damage of the diode and to bring it back into a state ready
for a subsequent photoelectron detection, the avalanche has to be quenched. This is done
by lowering the reverse bias voltage across the diode for a certain time. After allowing all
charge carriers to recombine and thus bringing the diode into an insulating state again, a
full photodetection cycle is finished and the diode is ready for the next event.
The usual configurations for that procedure are referred to passive and active quen-
ching[12]. In passive quenching, the diode is reverse-biased via a low-current network (e.g.
a large resistor Rq) such that the discharge current triggered by a photoelectron avalanche
causes a voltage drop, reducing the voltage across the diode below the breakdown voltage
(see figure 1). Then, the junction capacity Cj has to be recharged again to the full reverse
bias voltage. With usual passive quenching configurations, a recharge time on the order
of a microsecond is achieved. To obtain a faster recharge and thereby a shorter dead time,
active quenching techniques have to be used[7]. Yet, the discharge current and thus the
breakdown flash should not depend on the quenching configuration.
In our experiments, we used an APD with an integrated two stage thermoelectric cooler,
type C30902-SDTC from Perkin-Elmer. The diodes have a circular active area of 0.5 mm
diameter, and are accessible through a transparent window. They are mounted in modules
together with a high voltage supply, a discriminator to generate standard NIM pulses and
a temperature controller for the peltier element[13]. We use a current limiting network
instead of a quenching resistor, a measurement resistor of Rm = 100 Ω and a reverse
bias voltage of Ubias = 215 V at a temperature of −25 ◦C, which is approximately 20 V
above the breakdown of the APD. According to the manufacturer, the diodes are supposed
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Figure 2: (a) Discharge current ID(T ) of the avalanche photodiode during a breakdown
cycle. (b) Histogram of coincidence events of both photodetectors. The left peak corre-
sponds to photons emitted by diode 1 seen by diode 2. Both peaks have an exponential
decay with a time constant of 2.9 ns. The asymmetry is due to the different magnification
of the two diodes looking at each other. The shape of each peak resembles very much the
discharge current behaviour.
to show a single photon detection efficiency of up to 55% at a wavelength of 800 nm[14],
depending on operating conditions.
The discharge current ID(t) we measured under these conditions is shown in figure 2a.
It reflects an exponential decay, convoluted with a Gaussian distribution. From this mea-
surement, we obtain a total charge of
QD =
∫
TD(t) dt = 64 pC
released during a diode breakdown. From that value, we deduce a parasitic capacity Cp of
Cp = QD/20 V = 3.2 pF ,
assuming that during breakdown, most of the current through Rm is supplied by Cp, and
not by the biasing network.
3 Absolute photoemission rate
To determine the amount of light emitted during a breakdown cycle, we used an optical
arrangement sketched in figure 3. The active area of an APD module D1 is imaged with a
lens f = 50 mm onto a second APD, D2, with a demagnification of 2 (corresponding to
distances of g = 150 mm and b = 75 mm, respectively). This ensured that light emitted
from all parts of the active area of diode D1 could reach the active area of D2 even for
imperfect alignment. To define the solid angle of light collected from diode D1, we used
an aperture A with a diameter of 3 mm (and 5 mm in a second experiment) at a distance of
d = 123 mm from the diode. The corresponding solid angles are Ω3 = 4.67 · 10−4 sr and
Ω5 = 1.3 · 10
−3 sr, respectively.
The NIM pulses were sent both to PC-card based counters, and for timing analysis
to a digital oscilloscope (LeCroy LC574A). Using a pair trigger feature together with an
auxiliary delay line of 63 ns, we collected coincidence events of the two detectors and his-
togrammed their time differences t1− t2 in an interval of -40 ns to +60 ns with a resolution
of a few 100 ps.
To measure only the light emitted by the diode D1, we lowered the ambient light such
that D1 registered a count rate of r1 = 2634 cps. This is only moderately larger than the
dark count rate (approximately 500 cps) and ensures that scattering of external light to the
second diodeD2 is minimal. With the optical path open to the second diode and an aperture
diameter of 3 mm, we observe a count rate from diode D2 of r2 = 731 cps. Finally, only
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Figure 3: Setup to determine the integral fluorescence light. The active area of photodiode
D1 under investigation is imaged through a lens L onto a second photodiode D2, with an
aperture A defining the solid angle seen of diode D1. Both diodes are operating in passive
quenching Geiger mode. Their breakdown current is amplified, discriminated and sent to
counters and an oscilloscope to investigate coincident events (The signal of D1 is delayed
by 63 ns).
pair events are selected which ensures that only the properties of the breakdown flash were
analysed.
A histogram of time differences for double photo events is shown in figure 2b. One can
clearly recognize two peaks, the left one (t1 − t2 < 60 ns) corresponding to photo events
registered in detector D2 after a discharge of detector D1, and the right one corresponding
to the reverse process. The asymmetry in the amplitudes of the two peaks can be explained
by the asymmetry in the imaging optics, as the aperture is not located exactly at the lens
position, and/or by a difference in the amount light produced by the two diodes. Each peak
shows a rise time between 1 and 2 ns, and an exponential decay, probably following the
discharge current of the diode. The distribution h(∆t) of each peak of time differences
∆t = t1 − t2 in figure 2b has the same temporal pattern as the discharge current shown in
figure 2a.
We modeled a higher resolution histogram of the first peak of h(∆t) by a convolution
of an exponential decay with a time constant τ and a Gaussian distribution with a variance
σ. Using the model function
h(∆t) =
(
Θ(∆t) · e−∆t/τ
)
⊗
(
e−∆t
2/(2σ2)
)
,
where Θ(t) is a step function, we obtain fit values of τ = 2.75± 0.07 ns and σ = 0.72±
0.03 ns. The actual shape of this distribution is determined by the discharge network.
Integration over the pair distribution from t1 − t2 = 20 ns to 62 ns leads to a rate of
nc = 48.4 ± 1 s
−1 for photo events of detector D2 induced by breakdown events of D1;
the accidental count rate for that time window,
nacc = r1r2 · 42 ns = 0.081 s
−1
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Figure 4: Setup for measuring the breakdown flash spectrum. Light emitted form a diode
D1 is collimated through a lens L1 with a focal length of f = 150 mm, dispersed through
a diffraction grating G and detected after a fold mirror M with a second single photon
counting APDD2 after a collimation lensL2. The spectrum becomes visible in coincidence
events between the two detectors D1 and D2.
is negligible. With the breakdown rate r1 of D1 and the captured solid angle Ω3, and
assuming isotropic emission of the fluorescence light, we obtain a differential breakdown
emission intensity of
dnL
dΩ
=
nc/r1
Ω3
= 39 photons/sr
for each detected breakdown of the diodeD1. From a similar measurement with an aperture
diameter of 5 mm, we found a value of dnL/dΩ = 43 photons/sr. Within the accuracy of
the alignment of the photodetectors and the assumption of isotropy of emission, these two
values are compatible. However, these values do not contain a detection efficiency η yet.
Because this detection efficiency varies with the wavelength (and has a maximum of≈ 55%
at λ ≈ 820 nm[14]), an estimate of total rate can only be given with a knowledge of the
spectral distribution.
4 Spectral distribution of the breakdown emission
In order to evaluate possible countermeasures in experiments sensitive to the breakdown
light emission of an APD, we measured the spectral distribution of that light. Therefore,
we used again a setup of two single photon counting APDs looking at each other, where
we inserted a reflection grating as a tunable filter in the optical path as shown in figure 4.
The active area of the diode under investigation, D1, was placed in the focal plane of a
lens L1 (f = 150 mm) to collimate the light emitted in a diode breakdown. The first
diffraction order of a blazed grating (1200 lines/mm) was focused with another lens L2
onto the second APD, D2, acting as a photon detector. At a wavelength of 632 nm, we
thereby obtain a wavelength resolution of approximately 3.3 nm FWHM; we adjusted the
transmitted wavelength by turning the grating.
Again, we identify photons from the breakdown flash inD1 by looking for coincidences
of detector events in D1 andD2. We have chosen a coincidence time window of τc = 70 ns
after a breakdown ofD1. In the experiment, we recorded the number of coincidence events,
Nc(λ), and events N1(λ), N2(λ) of the individual detectors for an integration time T . To
obtain acceptable signal levels, we exposed detector D1 to a raised level of background
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Figure 5: Normalized breakdown flash spectrum of the silicon avalanche photodiode. The
emission is peaked around 850 nm. The curve shown is obtained by subtracting the acci-
dental coincidence rate from the raw measured coincidences and subsequent normalization
to the count rate of the emitting diode.
light, causing breakdown rates of N1/T ≈ 17000 . . .20000 s−1. The corresponding count
rate N2/T of detector D2 was in the range of 5000 . . .6000 s−1. The number of coinci-
dence events varied form 300 to 1100 counts over the recording periode.
We correct for accidental coincidences and fluctuations in the breakdown rates of APD
D1, and obtain a normalized spectral distribution I(λ) from our experimental data using
the expression:
I(λ) = α
Nc(λ) −N1(λ) ·N2(λ) · τc/T
N1(λ)
The spectrum obtained after an integration time of T = 50 sec per point is shown in
figure 5, using a normalization constant of α = 103.
One can identify a spectral emission ranging from 700 nm to 1000 nm, with a maximum
at 860 nm, two sharp edges at 872 nm and 913 nm, respectively, and two weaker maxima
at 900 nm and 980 nm, respectively. This structure is a product of the emission spectrum
of the breakdown light, the transfer function of our spectrometer setup and the spectral
sensitivity for photo detection of the second avalanche diodeD2. While the transmission of
the spectrometer is reasonably flat over the investigated region, the main deviation between
the measured and the emitted spectrum can be attributed to the wavelength dependency of
the quantum efficiency η(λ) of detector D2, which, according to the manufacturer, has a
smooth drop-off from 70% to 8% in the range of λ = 800 to 1000 nm[14]. However, the
key structures of the spectrum obtained are not an artefact of the detection efficiency, and
are characteristic to the generation process of the emitted light.
5 Impact of photoemission on a quantum cryptography
system
In our experiments, we tried to quantify the photoemission on breakdown of silicon avalanche
photodiodes in Geiger mode. This photoemission may allow a possible eavesdropper in a
quantum cryptography application to gain information of the outcome of a measurement
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Figure 6: Possible eavesdropping attack to quantum cryptography system. A single photon
carrying information on phase or polarization is sent from Alice to Bob without interception
by Eve. However, Eve could have access to the photons emitted by Bob upon detection,
and gain timing and/or polarization information of the detected photon.
simply by looking at this photoemission, as sketched in figure 6. It therefore has to be
ensured that the amount of light leaking back to a possible eavesdropper is small in order
to limit its knowledge on the outcome of the single particle measurement by Bob.
To minimize the amount of light generated in the first place, the capacity CP should
be reduced to a minimum. This technique, however, quickly reaches a limit with currently
available photodiode packages.
Another measure to reduce the emitted light would be the use of optical filters, blocking
the spectral range of 700-1000 mn in which photoemission occurs. However, this technique
is restricted to cases where the wavelength of the transmitted light is outside that range.
This is the case with recently developed diamond-based single photon sources[9], or using
shorter wavelength laser diode emission[15]. For systems using laser diodes around 850 nm
exploring an absorption minimum in optical fibers[16], this technique would require narrow
band interference filters around the emission wavelength of the diodes. Then, the possible
leakage of information to an eavesdropper can be made negligibly small, too.
Additionally, spatial filtering may be used to block light propagating back the quantum
channel. Assuming that the photoemission light is emitted without spatial coherence across
the photo detection surface, and that light to be detected is coming out of a single spatial
mode from an optical fiber or an equivalent spatial mode filter in a free space arrangement,
the back-propagating light is reduced.
To estimate the fraction of light coupled back, we first consider the breakdown flash
brilliance (i.e., the number of photons emitted per surface area and solid angle) for each
photon detection event. From our measurements, we find
B =
dnL
dΩ
·
1
AD
= 2 · 10−3
photons
sr · µm2
,
where AD is the sensitive area of the photodiode. The number of photons Nr collected
from such an incoherent source into a single spatial mode, characterized e.g. by a Gaussian
beam waist w0 and a corresponding divergence θD , is given by:
Nr = B ·
∞∫
r=0
e−2r
2/w2
0 rdr ·
∫
2pi
e−2θ
2/θ2
D dΩ ≈ B · w20Θ
2
D
pi2
4
= B ·
λ2
4
Integrating over a wavelength range from 700 nm to 1050 nm, we obtain a numerical value
ofNr = 3.6 ·10−4 photons coupled into the single spatial mode of the quantum channel for
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a detection event. This value is independent of the detailed structure of the coupling optics
as long as reciprocal optical elements are used. It is also only a lower limit obtainable with
a similar photodetector, since we have not taken into account the quantum efficiency of the
photo detector.
To correct for the quantum efficiency and to estimate the real number of photons cou-
pled back into the quantum channel, we use the measured spectral distribution I(λ) and
a detection efficiency η(λ) (i.e., the product of photoelectron generation probability given
by the manufacturer and the photoelectron detection efficiency of .55 at 20 V above break-
down) obtained from the manufacturer. Then, we numerically derive a correction factor
given by the expression:
β =
∫
I(λ)
η(λ)
dλ
/ ∫
I(λ)dλ
For a wavelength range from 700 nm to 1050 nm, we obtain a numerical value of β ≈ 3.5.
With this factor, we end up with a corrected numerical value of N corrr = βNr = 1.3 ·
10−3 photons coupled back into the single spatial mode of a quantum channel.
6 Summary
To summarize, we quantified the photoemission behavior of a silicon avalanche diode dur-
ing a breakdown, such as induced by a detection event of a single photon, we found an
emission spectrum ranging from 700 nm to 1000 nm, and estimated the possible leak of in-
formation to a possible eavesdropper due to this effect. Whereas this emission might have
to be considered for single atom and molecule spectroscopy, in quantum cryptography the
backdoor for an eavesdropper can be closed by taking some care with spectral and spatial
mode filtering. It remains to be investigated if photodiodes used for quantum cryptography
systems[17] in the telecom wavelength range (1300 nm and 1550 nm) which are usually
based on InGaAs or Ge, show a similar effect. With InGaAs being a direct semiconductor,
one could expect it to be more likely for charge carriers to undergo radiative recombinations
than in silicon or germanium, thus showing a stronger breakdown flash.
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